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The increased specialisation visible in economics research has been intertwined with the gradual dis-
appearance of the study of the history of 
economic thought from universities world-
wide. However, perhaps ironically, the 
fragmentation or super-specialisation of 
economics research also contains within 
it the need to understand how these dif-
ferent research agendas might be under-
stood in a coherent manner. Alessandro 
Roncaglia’s The Age of Fragmentation: A 
History of Contemporary Economic Thought 
(2019), the book under review, provides 
the readers with a clear analytical lens to 
understand the seemingly disparate and 
divergent streams of economics research 
which emerged after World War II. His 
previous book The Wealth of Ideas: A Histo-
ry of Economic Thought (2009) remains an 
important text in the domain of history 
of economic thought (HET hereafter) in 
particular and economics in general; a 
concise version of it was published in 
2016 as A Brief History of Economic Thought 
(for my assessment, see Thomas 2019). 
Theories of Value and Distribution
Roncaglia begins the book by highlight-
ing the two fundamentally different and 
contending approaches to the theory of 
value and income distribution—the classi-
cal approach of William Petty, Adam Smith, 
David Ricardo, and Karl Marx and the 
marginalist approach of Carl Menger, 
Stanley Jevons, Leon Walras, and later, 
Alfred Marshall. While the classical eco-
nomists possess an “objective” theory of 
value, whether understood in terms of 
the amount of land and labour used up in 
production or solely in terms of labour 
(p 15), the marginalist economists deve-
loped a “subjective” theory of value by 
recourse to the notion of utility (p 24), 
something which lacks an objective unit 
of measurement, such as the acres of 
land or the hours of labour. The funda-
mental unit of analysis in classical eco-
nomics is a social class vis-à-vis the aso-
cial individual in marginalist economics 
(pp 18, 25). In the classical approach, in-
come distribution was “built on the op-
position between the main social class-
es” (p 20), whereas in marginalist eco-
nomics, the opposition gave way to a 
harmonious theory of income distribu-
tion with each factor of production receiv-
ing a remuneration based on their respec-
tive contribution (p 24), appropriately 
called the marginal productivity theory 
of income distribution. 
The differences existing within these 
paradigms are also attended to in the 
book. For instance, Roncaglia notes that 
Jeremy Bentham’s “one dimensional 
view of felicifi c calculus” was criticised 
by John Stuart Mill because he thought 
that “quantitative differences between 
different kinds of pleasures and pains … 
cannot be reduced to quantitative differ-
ences” (p 22). 
Knut Wicksell “developed a marginal-
ist theory of distribution between capi-
tal, land and labour based on their mar-
ginal productivities;” given that capital 
is a bundle of heterogenous commodi-
ties, he oscillated “between an aggre-
gate and a disaggregated notion of capi-
tal” (p 33). It was Wicksell who formu-
lated a distinction between the natural 
rate of interest (determined by the mar-
ginal productivity of capital) and the 
monetary rate of interest (determined in 
the money market), which was utilised 
to explain the trade cycle and infl ation 
(p 34). For Wicksell, despite adopting 
the marginalist theory of value and dis-
tribution, monetary variables do exert 
an infl uence on real variables. 
Marginalist Economics
Objection to the marginalist approach to 
economics, especially its reliance on 
methodological individualism—the indi-
vidual as the fundamental unit of analy-
sis—came from Thorstein Veblen who 
underscored the role of “social habits 
and customs” in understanding the soci-
ety; others who have contributed to this 
tradition, which works on the “border-
line between economics, sociology and 
history,” include Wesley Mitchell, John 
Kenneth Galbraith, Gunnar Myrdal, and 
Shigeto Tsuru (pp 35–37). 
While Joseph Schumpeter also espoused 
a cautious view of methodological indi-
vidualism, he adopted the marginalist 
supply-and-demand approach towards 
value but rejected Jevons’s identifi cation 
of value with utility (p 42). Schumpeter 
identifi ed the following as crucial agents 
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of economic development: the entrepre-
neur and the banker; the former inno-
vates, and the latter fi nances the innova-
tion (pp 44–45). However, he also adopt-
ed the marginalist assumption that, in 
equilibrium, there is full employment of 
all productive resources; this underlies 
his notion of “creative destruction” in his 
theory of the trade cycle (p 69). 
Alongside and connected to his criti-
cal contribution of the principle of effec-
tive demand—that panned leakages is 
brought into equilibrium with planned 
injections to the circular fl ow of income via 
variations in aggregate activity levels—
John Maynard Keynes demonstrated that 
monetary variables infl uence real varia-
bles, such as real output and employment 
in direct contrast to the marginalist frame-
work. Notwithstanding the (residual) pres-
ence of marginalist elements in Keynes’s 
The General Theory, interest rate expresses 
the preference for liquidity and not the 
marginal productivity of capital as in 
Wicksell or the rate of time preference as 
in modern marginalist macroeconomics. 
Hayek and Sraffa
The only two economists who get an en-
tire chapter for themselves are Friedrich 
von Hayek, the “founder of neo-liberal-
ism” and Piero Sraffa, “the revolutionary” 
(the respective titles of Chapters 4 and 5). 
At the core of Hayek’s economics is the 
view that “a totally laissez-faire economy 
tends to grow more than an economy where 
the state plays an active role” (p 62). After 
reading his work, Lionel Robbins, now 
widely famous for his “scarcity” defi ni-
tion of economics, invited Hayek to give 
some lectures in London and also sup-
ported his appointment to an economics 
chair at the London School of Economics 
(p 64). While Hayek accepts the margin-
alist theory of value, he ascribes a signifi -
cant role to monetary factors in his theory 
of the trade cycle, a causation which is 
irreconcilable with the marginalist di-
chotomy between real and monetary fac-
tors (p 70). Revisiting the Hayek–Sraffa 
debate surrounding the latter’s concep-
tion of the natural rate of interest and 
capital (via recourse to the average period 
of production which he later abandons 
[p 73]) can provide important insights 
for contemporary macroeconomics. (It is 
from Sraffa’s intervention that Keynes 
derived the theory of own interest rates 
[p 100].) Hayek, unlike traditional mar-
ginalists, sees the choices of the economic 
agent “as an experiment in conditions 
of uncertainty, the result of which mod-
ifi es initial knowledge and expectations 
in a continuous process” (p 77). Roncaglia 
views Hayek’s support for the market as 
an “able rhetorical exercise, but totally 
devoid of analytic foundations” (p 78). 
Roncaglia’s chapter on Sraffa begins 
by highlighting his signifi cant infl uence 
on Antonio Gramsci and Ludwig Witt-
genstein.1 After discussing his early con-
tributions on money and banking, Sraffa’s 
devastating criticism of Marshallian theo-
ry is outlined which exposes its “contra-
diction between increasing returns and 
competitive equilibrium” (p 97). Sub se-
quently, a section is devoted to Sraffa’s 
work on putting together Ricardo’s writ-
ings, published in 10 volumes and an in-
dex, which continues to be “recognized 
as a model of philological rigour” (p 101). 
Sraffa’s 1960 book Production of Com-
modities by Means of Commodities revived 
the classical approach to the theory of 
value and distribution by providing an 
analytically coherent value theory where-
in one distributive variable is exogenously 
determined, as was customary subsist-
ence wages in the old classical econo-
mists. The criticism of the marginalist 
theory of value based on its notion of 
(aggregate) capital as a factor of produc-
tion also has an important implication 
for contemporary marginalist macro-
economics: it challenges the notion of 
“well-behaved demand curves for capi-
tal,” which monotonically increase as 
the wage rate increases so as to “guaran-
tee convergence towards full employ-
ment equilibrium” (pp 109, 129). 
‘New’ Economics
The next four chapters of the book re-
spectively deal with “new” microeco-
nomics (mainly expected utility and 
general equilibrium theories), “Macroe-
conomics of the Neoclassical Synthesis” 
(Phillips curve and supply-side growth 
theories), “Neo-liberal streams” (Aus-
trian econo mics, rational expectations, 
and public choice), and “applied econo-
mics and econometrics.”2 
By treating utility as a “natural pheno-
menon, capable of objective measure-
ment,” John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern are drawing from the cardi-
nal utility approach within marginalist 
economics prior to Vilfredo Pareto’s or-
dinal utility approach (p 115). The de-
generation of the notion of equilibrium 
from long-period general equilibrium 
(found in Ricardo and Walras) to modern 
intertemporal and temporary general 
equilibrium models is visible in Chapter 6 
(especially pp 119–25); the correspond-
ence between the actual and the theo-
retical world, visible in the traditional 
notion of equilibrium which was under-
stood as a tendency of actual variables 
to gravitate towards theoretical varia-
bles, has been severed with the new no-
tions of equilibrium which represent 
purely formal solutions and they also 
suffer from “negative results as far as 
uniqueness and stability of equilibrium 
are concerned” (pp 125; see also p 127, 
note 27). In particular, marginalist eco-
nomic theory fi nds it diffi cult to accom-
modate two central features of modern 
economies: increasing returns to scale 
and non-convexity of production sets 
(p 125, note 22 and p 127). But then, in 
the 1970s, research began to be “focused 
on the specifi cation of circumstances that 
hinder or render impossible the optimal 
functioning of the market,” most notably 
the implications from “asymmetric or 
imperfect information” (pp 144–45). This 
is also visible in the “new Keynesian” 
strand of marginalist macroeconomics, 
which “try to provide microeconomic 
reasons for the rigidities that at a macro 
level cause unemployment” (p 158); the 
various rigidities considered by Joseph 
Stiglitz, a main exponent of this approach, 
are “imperfect information, price rigidity, 
non-competitive markets” (p 158, note 15). 
Ludwig von Mises, whom Hayek con-
siders his mentor, initially worked on 
monetary economics and later developed 
a “science of human action” (pp 186–88). 
In his rejection of mathematical formal-
ism, his standpoint was different from 
that of marginalist economics (p 189). 
And despite Mises, Hayek, and Schum-
peter stressing that their theories of the 
trade cycle deal with “market processes” 
and not “market equilibrium,” Austrian 
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economic theories “presuppose the as-
sumption of full utilization of productive 
resources,” a key tenet of marginalist 
economics (p 189). Roncaglia cites the 
contrasting case of George Shackle, a 
student of Hayek, who “converted to 
Keynesianism” and subsequently exam-
ined the “complex role of expectations in 
the decisional process” (p 190, note 21). 
The current mainstream in macro-
economic policy and teaching combine 
“elements of the neoclassical synthesis, 
monetarism and rational expectations 
theory” and may be termed the “new 
neoclassical synthesis” (p 207). Ron-
caglia is right in expressing concern 
about the fact that the mushrooming 
“applied analyses [which] are utilized 
in search for interpretations of current 
economic events” mostly do not rely on 
economic theory and seem “unaware of 
the theoretical debates, for instance 
those concerning the theory of value 
and distribution” (p 230). 
Mainstream Economics
Roncaglia also rightly expresses unease 
over the imperialist nature of main-
stream economics which seeks “to bring 
all aspects of human life within the com-
pass of economic science” (p 114); Gary 
Becker, drawing on the work of his 
teacher George Stigler, pioneered the 
application of the marginalist theory of 
value, or more accurately one of its ele-
ments—that of utility maximisation—
“to issues ranging from drug addiction 
to advertising, from marriage to begging, 
from discrimination to crime” (p 132). 
More recently, social identities (such as 
gender and religion) have been included 
as an argument in utility functions; 
however, given the marginalist assump-
tion of independent preference sets, 
Roncaglia correctly points out that so-
cial issues such as “[r]eputation, identity 
and belonging … may be included only 
artifi cially in such theories” (p 133). 
James Buchanan extended the appli-
cation of utility maximisation (by asocial 
individuals) to political science where 
politics is not seen as the
search for optimal collective choices, but as 
an enquiry into decisional rules, fi nalised to 
the resolution of confl icts among individu-
als. (p 209; emphasis added)
This approach falls under public choice 
theory; a rather misleading title given 
the absence of any “public” in the real 
sense of the term. It was subsequently 
“redefi ned as political economy” (p 210), 
creating yet another source of confusion 
especially vis-à-vis the political economy 
of Smith, Ricardo, and Marx. The ongoing 
work of Daren Acemoglu also falls into 
this “political economy” tradition (p 334). 
Challenges
Challenges to the assumption of the ra-
tional asocial individual (homo economi-
cus), the foundational unit of analysis of 
marginalist economics, also arose from 
behavioural economics (Herbert Simon, 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky) 
and experimental economics (Vernon 
Smith). While the latter conducts experi-
ments in “the search for regularities in 
the actual behaviour of agents” (p 247), 
the former challenges the notion of nor-
mal behaviour predicted by expected 
utility theory via the concepts of “bound-
ed rationality and satisfi cing behaviour” 
(p 249). Behavioural and experimental 
economics draw on ideas from psychology 
and neurobiology, respectively (pp 248–
49); such interdisciplinary work has gen-
erated new research programmes like 
neuroeconomics, cognitive economics, 
and theoretical experimental economics 
(also known as agent-based models 
which rely on computer programmes) 
(pp 255–56). The work of Kahneman and 
Tversky extended the expected utility 
theory by incorporating risk and thus 
the prospect theory was born (p 261). 
This led to “a long series of empirical 
studies aimed at confi rming, criticising 
or better specifying the behavioural as-
sumptions” (p 262). In a similar way, 
utility functions were modifi ed in differ-
ent ways and the following theories were 
proposed: regret theory and disappoint-
ment theory (pp 262–63). Richard Thaler, 
whose work falls under the prospect 
theory, rightly “considers behavioural 
economics as a development, not an al-
ternative, to the marginalist mainstream 
tradition” (p 263) and therefore his poli-
cy conclusion is not surprising:
rely on market forces while public authori-
ties should limit themselves to exerting a 
gentle push (nudge) for addressing agents to 
overcome the deviations from fully rational 
behaviour. (p 264) 
An effective challenge to neoclassical 
synthesis (particularly the neutrality of fi n-
ancial choices in undertaking investment), 
monetarism, and Eugene Fama’s theory 
of effi cient fi nancial markets arises from 
the work of Hyman Minsky. Minsky’s as-
sumptions of “uncertainty, fi nancial fra-
gility, [and] money manager capitalism” 
generate an economic theory which un-
derscores capitalism’s “systemic instabil-
ity, namely the predisposition to crises” 
(pp 280, 284). Therefore, government 
intervention is required to “establish and 
enforce a ‘good fi nancial society’” (p 285, 
note 28). Much like Keynes, Minsky fa-
vours an active preventive position than 
“ex post measures” (p 285). From Ron-
caglia’s discussion of mainstream fi nancial 
economics, fi nancial institutions, and fi n-
ancial regulation policies (pp 269–79) 
and other issues throughout the book, it is 
abundantly clear that in the production 
of economic theories, the ends are not 
independent of the means. However, given 
the marginalist theory of value and dis-
tribution, it is only by taking recourse to 
ad hoc assumptions or modifi cations that 
the users of the theory can justify gov-
ernment intervention in the economy. 
Non-marginalist Economics
To provide students and policymakers 
with an alternative framework of under-
standing and managing the macroecon-
omy, one must look to non-marginalist 
alternatives, and it is here that the study 
of economic thought becomes particu-
larly signifi cant. Some of the notable 
non-marginalist economists in Cam-
bridge, besides Keynes and Sraffa, were 
Maurice Dobb, Richard Kahn, Nicholas 
Kaldor, Michał Kalecki, and Joan Robin-
son. Kalecki had arrived at the principle 
of effective demand independently of 
Keynes via the Marxian route. Kaldor’s 
analysis of growth assumed increasing 
returns to scale and treated technologi-
cal progress as endogenous (p 297). 
Post-Keynesian economists, both past 
(such as Kahn, Kaldor, and Robinson) 
and present “consider it misleading to 
represent markets as in simultaneous 
equilibrium, for commodities as for mon-
ey, based on well-defi ned and suffi ciently 
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stable demand and supply functions” as 
in the IS–LM set-up (p 299). Roncaglia 
devotes a section to the capital theory 
debates (pp 303–08; for a highly accessible 
and recently published survey focusing on 
the second stage of the capital theory 
 debates, see Fratini 2019).3 
Inspired by the work of Sraffa, Pieran-
gelo Garegnani, Luigi Pasinetti, and 
Paolo Sylos Labini made signifi cant con-
tributions to the different aspects of val-
ue theory, capital theory, growth theory, 
and fi rm theory (pp 310–16). To this ini-
tial group, I would add the work of 
Krishna Bharadwaj who made lasting 
contributions to classical economics, both 
theoretical and empirical (in her analy-
sis of the Indian economy, particularly 
the agricultural sector).4 Rather than 
Roncaglia’s manner of classifying the 
work of these three economists as falling 
into three distinct “Sraffi an schools,” I 
prefer the classifi cation employed in As-
promourgos (2004) of “Sraffi an research 
programmes” as it is analytically richer 
and more useful for new researchers. 
In the penultimate chapter, Roncaglia 
presents the other signifi cant non-mar-
ginalist research stream of Marxism but 
devotes inadequate space to it (pp 321–26). 
Although he includes evolutionism and 
institutionalism in this chapter, they are 
not strictly non-marginalist as Roncaglia 
himself notes, the infl uence of subter-
raneous reference to the marginalist 
tradition within the evolutionary and 
institutional research streams is often 
apparent (p 336). 
The fi nal chapter is titled “Ethics and 
the Problem of Power” where Roncaglia 
discusses “income inequalities as an eth-
ical issue” (pp 360–63), welfare econom-
ics, and Amartya Sen’s capabilities ap-
proach; although, strictly speaking, Sen’s 
work also has marginalist foundations. 
Conclusions
I now offer some observations on the 
overall presentation and nature of the 
book. The book would have benefi ted 
from a concluding chapter which high-
lights the role of the theory of value in 
all aspects of economics; as Roncaglia 
writes while discussing institutionalism, 
“no economics approach can do without 
a theory of value” (pp 336, 348). The use 
of footnotes as opposed to endnotes 
makes the reading of the book pleasura-
ble as they are variously employed to 
 explain a concept (p 281 for instance), 
provide further reading (p 250, note 2 on 
behavioural economics), or highlight ad-
ditional crucial assumptions (p 117, note 9 
on the crucial assumption of probabilis-
tic independence in decision theory). 
While Roncaglia extensively utilises ar-
ticles published in the History of Political 
Economy and the Journal of Economic 
Literature, more references to articles pub-
lished in other professional HET jour-
nals, such as the European Journal of the 
History of Economic Thought and Journal 
of the History of Economic Thought would 
have been welcome. 
Some sections serve as good readings 
in regular courses in economic develop-
ment (for instance, Section 7.6 entitled 
“Theories of Economic Development”). 
In this particular section, Roncaglia pro-
vides an overview of an array of “laws” 
arising from empirical analysis: Engel’s 
law, Wagner’s law, Baumol’s law, Kuznet’s 
law, and Verdoorn’s law (pp 167–69). 
Chapter 7 which deals with the “Macro-
economics of the Neoclassical Synthe-
sis,” may be prescribed as essential read-
ing for an intermediate level macroeco-
nomics course. 
Marshall was instrumental in promot-
ing the notion, currently dominant, that 
knowledge in economics proceeds in a 
cumulative way and that therefore read-
ing “older” texts is unnecessary. As Ron-
caglia writes, Marshall viewed Ricardo 
as “a somewhat imprecise and unilateral 
precursor of modern theory” and conse-
quently “no reason emerges to waste 
time on Ricardo’s works” (p 101). The 
rapid rise of the textbook culture in eco-
nomics education has further solidifi ed 
the key tenets of marginalist economics 
by ignoring especially the important cri-
tiques posed from those external to its 
paradigm. This is visible as early as in 
Paul Samuelson’s textbook which ignored 
Sraffa’s critiques although he engaged with 
it in his other writings (p 130, note 30). 
Roncaglia’s book provides a magnifi -
cent account of the history of contempo-
rary economic ideas by tracing their 
roots in either the marginalist or the 
classical theory of value and distribution, 
highlighting the implicit assumptions of 
mainstream theories, pointing out im-
portant debates and powerful critiques 
many of which have not made their way 
to contemporary economics teaching 
and research, offering alternatives to 
marginalist mainstream economics, and 
by situating this history in the relevant 
intellectual and political climate. In con-
clusion, the book reaffi rms that HET, as a 
way of doing economics, not only offers 
a more active way of learning main-
stream economics but also provides co-
herent alternatives to it in the areas of 
teaching, research, and policy.
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Notes
1  In a recent biography of Frank Ramsey, a close 
associate and friend of Keynes, Sraffa, and 
Wittgenstein, Misak (2020) convincingly ar-
gues that Ramsey had a more signifi cant infl u-
ence than hitherto recognised on Wittgen-
stein’s later philosophy than what can be dis-
cerned from the latter’s writings (for the domi-
nant interpretation, see pp 98–99 in Ronca-
glia’s book). 
2  Krishna (2019) surveys the evolution of econo-
metrics with a section devoted to the develop-
ments in India (see pp 229–32). 
3  Drawing on the insights from this debate, I had 
co-authored a critical commentary which 
showed the theoretical and empirical problems 
of using an aggregate production function to 
understanding India’s economic growth (Joshi 
and Thomas 2013). 
4  See Omkarnath (2018) for a short intellectual 
biography of Bharadwaj and especially section 
VI for her contributions to the analysis of the 
Indian economy published in a special issue of 
Artha Vijnana devoted to the “Indian reception 
of Piero Sraffa’s economic contributions.” 
REFERENCES
Aspromourgos, Tony (2004): “Sraffi an Research 
Programmes and Unorthodox Economics,” 
Review of Political Economy, Vol 16, No 2, 
pp 179–206. 
Fratini, Saverio (2019): “On the Second Stage of the 
Cambridge Capital Controversy,” Journal of 
Economic Surveys, Vol 33, No 4, pp 1073–93. 
Joshi, D P Priyadarshi and Alex M Thomas (2013): 
“Using an Aggregate Production Function: 
Some Methodological Issues,” Economic & Po-
litical Weekly, Vol 48, No 17, pp 55–56.
Krishna, K L (2019): “Historical Perspective of 
Econometrics,” Pluralistic Economics and Its 
History, Sinha, A and A M Thomas (eds), Oxon: 
Routledge. 
Misak, Cheryl (2020): Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Ex-
cess of Powers, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Omkarnath, Goddanti (2018): “The Chosen One: 
Krishna Bharadwaj (1935–92),” Artha Vijnana, 
Vol 60, No 1, pp 34–43. 
Thomas, Alex M (2019): “A Brief History of Eco-
nomic Thought: A Review Essay,” Artha 
 Vijnana, Vol 61, No 4, pp 364–72.
